


















 This paper presents dynamic general equilibrium models of imperfect credit 
markets, in which the economy fluctuates endogenously along its unique 
equilibrium path.  During a recession, the net worth of the agents is too low and 
they cannot finance their trading activities.  Much of the saving thus goes to 
business investment, which creates jobs, thereby making the next generation of the 
agents richer.   As the economy booms and the net worth of the agents improves, 
they can eventually finance their trading activities, which do not create any job.  As 
more credit is extended to trading at the expense of business investment, the 
economy plunges into a recession.  The whole process repeats itself.  Endogenous 
fluctuations occur because, as in ecological cycles driven by predator-prey 
interaction, good investment breeds bad investment, which destroys good 
investment. 
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1. Introduction 
 This paper presents models of endogenous business cycles based on the following idea.  
Some investments are good, while others are bad.  Good investments are like those in the business 
sector, which create jobs and purchase inputs, thereby generating much aggregate demand 
spillovers.  On the other hand, some investments, like trading and speculation in the commodity 
and real estate markets, generate little aggregate demand spillovers, even though they may be 
highly profitable.  Furthermore, some of these investments are relatively difficult to finance, 
because their default risk is high.  During the recession, the agents are not rich enough to finance 
these investments. Much of the saving thus goes to the business sector, and many businesses are 
formed.  This generates a large demand for labor and other inputs, which benefits other agents as 
well.  As the economy expands, the agents become richer.  With an improved net worth, the 
agents can finance their trading activities.  Saving is now redirected from business investment to 
trading, which have little demand spillovers.  At the peak of the boom, this change in the 
composition of credit and of investment causes a deterioration of the net worth, and the economy 
plunges into a recession.  The whole process repeats itself.  Endogenous fluctuations occur 
because good investment breeds bad investment, which destroys good investment, as in ecological 
cycles driven by predator-prey or host-parasite interactions.
2 
 To capture this general idea in a concrete manner, the models developed below use many 
specific assumptions, made for the most part to simplify the analysis.  Two key specifications of 
the model should be mentioned.  First, the overlapping generations structure is used to model 
aggregate demand spillovers.  More specifically, there are overlapping agents who live for two 
periods.  Each generation earns and saves the wage income in their first period.  They use their 
savings to finance the investment project.  Because the project requires the minimum level of 
investment, they also have to borrow from the credit market.  There are two types of investment, 
the Good and the Bad.  When more credit is extended to the Good (business investment), more 
firms are set up and more jobs are created, which improves the net worth of the younger 
generation, and helping them to finance their investment projects.  When credit is extended for the 
                                                                            
2While the intuition behind fluctuations is similar with that of predator-prey cycles in biology, our models are 
mathematically quite different from what mathematical biologists call the predator-prey models (see, e.g., Murray 
1990). Credit Cycles, January 22, 2002, 1:57 PM 
  2
Bad (trading), it does not create any job for the young; the traders simply hoard and stockpile 
goods.  Thus the investment in trading activities does not benefit the next generations of the 
agents.  The second key feature is the borrowing constraint, which arises endogenously due to the 
risk of (potential) defaults.
3  The key condition for endogenous fluctuations is that the difficulty of 
enforcing repayment is large enough for the credit extended to trading that the agents cannot 
make the Bad investment when the net worth is low, but small enough that they can when it is 
high.  This means that, in recessions, much of the saving goes to business investment, and as the 
economy booms, more saving is redirected from business investment to trading.  One major 
advantage of using these specifications is that they make the model simple enough to allow for a 
global analysis of the nonlinear dynamical system governing the equilibrium trajectory in terms of 
a few key parameters. 
 It is commonly argued that the waves of economic expansions and contractions are caused 
by the changing nature of credit and investment at different phases of business cycles.  At the peak 
of the boom, the argument goes, more credit is extended to finance “socially unproductive” 
activities, such as trading in the commodity, real estate, and stock markets.  Such an expansion of 
credit fuels speculative manias, which destabilize the economy. (See Kindleberger 1996 for a 
review of the basic argument.)  Central bankers indeed seem concerned that financial frenzies that 
emerge after a period of economic expansion might lead to misallocation of credit, thereby 
pushing the economy into a recession, and they often attempt to take precautionary measures to 
achieve a soft landing of the economy.  The present paper does provide a theoretical argument for 
the view that changing compositions of credit and of investment are responsible for creating 
instability and fluctuations.  Furthermore, the equilibrium dynamics display some features 
reminiscent of the popular argument.
4  It should be emphasized, however, that the present paper 
does not assume any irrationality on the side of the agents.  Contrary to the popular argument, 
                                                                            
3Macroeconomic models of imperfect credit markets based on imperfect enforcement of repayment and strategic  
defaults include Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996, Ch. 6.1 and 6.2), Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and Aghion, Banerjee, 
and Piketty (1999).  The specification here follows those of Matsuyama (2000a, 2000b). 
4 The idea explored here also has some vague resemblance to that of Hawtrey, who put (wholesale) traders at the 
center of his theory.  He argued that the traders play a pivotal role at the turning point of business cycles, as their 
investment becomes sensitive to a small change in the interest rate, after their inventory stock has been built up.  
See, for example, Hawtrey (1913), which incidentally inspired the title of this paper. Credit Cycles, January 22, 2002, 1:57 PM 
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instability is not caused by “irrational extension of credit” or “irrational exuberance” in the models 
developed below.
5  
 Recent studies in macroeconomics of imperfect credit markets have emphasized the role of 
borrowing constraints in generating credit multipliers.  Among the most influential are Bernanke 
and Gertler (1989) and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997).  Both studies, as well as many others, have 
shown how the borrowing constraint could magnify external shocks and create persistence in 
propagation of business cycles.  In these models, a high (low) net worth of the agent stimulates 
(discourages) business investment, which contributes to a high (low) net worth of the agents.  In 
the absence of exogenous shocks, no persistent fluctuation occurs in these models.
6  The present 
model, on the other hand, emphasizes a reversal mechanism, where a higher net worth of the 
agent leads to a decline in business investment, so that the economy perpetually alternates 
between periods of expansion and of contraction, even in the absence of any external 
disturbances.  In other words, the credit multiplier mechanism explains why an economic 
expansion can be a slow, prolonged process, while the mechanism here explains why such an 
expansion is reversed.  The key difference is that, in a credit multiplier model, an improved net 
worth of the agents redirects the savings away from the investment without aggregate demand 
spillovers towards the investment with aggregate demand spillovers, while in a credit reversal 
model, it redirects the savings in the opposite direction.  Needless to say, these effects are not 
mutually exclusive, and can be usefully combined.  Indeed, in section 5, the model is extended to 
allow for three types of investment, the Good (business investment), the Bad (trading), and the 
Ugly (storage), where the Ugly, like the Bad, does not generate any demand spillovers, but is not 
subject to any borrowing constraint.  In this extended model, the credit multiplier mechanism is 
operative in recessions and the credit reversal mechanism is operative in booms.  It will be shown 
                                                                            
5 Indeed, fluctuations are not at all driven by the expectations of the agents, whether they are rational or not.  
Contrary to most existing studies on endogenous business cycles, which rely on indeterminacy and self-fulfilling 
expectations, the equilibrium path is unique in this paper. Endogenous fluctuations occur because the unique 
steady state loses its stability. 
6In one variation of their models, Kiyotaki and Moore (1997; Section III) demonstrated that the equilibrium 
dynamics display oscillatory convergence to the steady state, which is why they called their paper, “Credit Cycles.”  
However, these oscillations occur because they added the assumption that the investment opportunity arrives 
stochastically to each agent.  The borrowing constraints in all of their models work only to amplify the movement 
caused by shocks, instead of reversing it.  In any case, in all of their models, the steady state is stable and any 
fluctuations will dissipate in the absence of exogenous shocks. Credit Cycles, January 22, 2002, 1:57 PM 
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that, by combining the two effects, the extended model generates business fluctuations that are 
asymmetric; the economy experiences a long, slow process of recovery from a recession, followed 
by a rapid expansion, and, possibly after a period of high volatility, plunges to a recession. 
 The present paper is not the first to demonstrate endogenous credit cycles.
7  The 
mechanism explored here, however, differs significantly from those explored in the existing 
studies.  In Azariadis and Smith (1998), the credit market cannot tell the investors from the 
savers.  At a low level of the capital stock, the return to the investment is high, and the savers 
prefer lending; they have no incentive to misrepresent themselves.  Thus, the equilibrium loan 
contract does not impose any limit on the amount that the investors can borrow.  At a high level 
of the capital stock, the return to the investment is low.  Instead of lending, the savers would be 
tempted to borrow, by misrepresenting themselves as the investors, and abscond with their loans.  
To prevent such frauds in the presence of asymmetric information, the equilibrium loan contract 
imposes the credit limit to make it unattractive for the savers, which reduces the volume of the 
credit extended to the true investors.  In their framework, expansions stop when the credit 
constraints on business investment are tightened.  In the present framework, expansions stop 
when the credit constraints on trading activities are loosened, which squeeze out business 
investment.  Aghion, Banerjee and Piketty (1999) is also based on the separation of the savers and 
investors.  In their model, the investment is always constrained by the wealth of the investors. 
When the investors own a small fraction of the aggregate wealth, the investment falls short of the 
saving, and the equilibrium interest rate is low, which helps to redistributes the wealth from the 
savers (i.e., the lenders) to the investors (i.e., the borrowers).  When the investors own a large 
fraction of the wealth, the investment exceeds the saving, which pushes up the equilibrium interest 
rate, and hence redistributes the wealth from the investors to the savers.  In the models developed 
below, all the agents have the same level of wealth, so that wealth distribution plays no role in 
generating cycles.  Furthermore, in both Azariadis-Smith and Aghion-Banerjee-Piketty, the 
                                                                            
7For a survey on endogenous business cycles in general, see Boldrin and Woodford (1990) and Guesnerie and 
Woodford (1992). Credit Cycles, January 22, 2002, 1:57 PM 
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composition of the investment does not change over the cycles.  Here, changing composition of 
the investment is the essential part of the story.
8   
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 presents the model and derives 
the dynamical system that governs the equilibrium trajectory for the case where business 
investment never faces the borrowing constraint.  Section 3 characterizes the equilibrium for a full 
set of parameter values, which enables us to identify the condition under which the steady state 
loses its stability and endogenous fluctuations occur.  Some examples of chaotic behaviors are 
also presented at the end of this section.  Section 4 shows that the results are robust, when the 
borrowing constraint on business investment is reintroduced.  Section 5 develops a hybrid model, 
which incorporates the credit multiplier effect as well as the credit reversal effect.  Section 6 
concludes. 
 
2. The Model. 
Time is discrete and extends from zero to infinity (t = 0, 1, 2, ...). The economy is 
populated by overlapping generations of two-period lived agents.  Each generation consists of a 
continuum of agents with unit mass. There is one final good, which is taken as the numeraire and 
can be either consumed or invested.  Each agent supplies one unit of labor to the business sector 
in the first period, and consumes only in the second. Thus, the aggregate labor supply is Lt = 1, 
and the wage income, wt, is also the net worth of the young at the end of period t.  The young in 
period t need to allocate their net worth to finance their consumption in period t+1.  The 
following options are available to them. 
First, all the young agents can lend a part or all of the net worth in the competitive credit 
market, which earns the gross return equal to rt+1 per unit.  If they lend the entire net worth, their 
second-period consumption is equal to rt+1wt.  Second, some young agents have access to an 
investment project and may use a part or all of the net worth to finance it.  There are two types of 
projects, both of which come in discrete units.  Each young agent has access to at most one type 
of the project, and each young agent can manage at most one project.  More specifically, 
                                                                            
8 In this respect, the models developed below are similar to the growth cycle model of Matsuyama (1999), in which 
the two types of investment, factor accumulation and innovation, alternate as the main engine of growth over the 
cycles.  Credit Cycles, January 22, 2002, 1:57 PM 
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 The Good Investment: 
 A fraction m1 of the young are entrepreneurs, who know how to start a firm in the business 
sector. Setting up a firm requires one unit of the final good invested in period t.  This enables 
these agents to produce f(nt+1) units of the final good in period t+1 by employing nt+1 units of 
labor at the competitive wage rate, wt+1.  The production function satisfies f(n) > 0, f¢(n) > 0 and 
f†(n) < 0 for all n > 0.  Let us denote the gross profit from running a firm in period t+1 by pt+1.  
Since wt+1 = f¢(nt+1) in equilibrium, the equilibrium gross profit can be expressed as an increasing 
function of the equilibrium employment, pt+1 = p(nt+1) ” f(nt+1) - f¢(nt+1)nt+1 with p¢(nt+1) = 
-f†(nt+1)nt+1 > 0. 
 If wt < 1, these agents need to borrow by 1 - wt > 0 in the competitive credit market to 
start the project.  If wt > 1, they can start the project and lend by wt - 1 > 0.  In either case, the 
second-period consumption is equal to pt+1 - rt+1(1-wt) if they start the project, which is greater 
than rt+1wt (the second-period consumption if they simply lend the entire net worth in the credit 
market) if and only if 
(1) pt+1 ‡ rt+1. 
The entrepreneurs want to (or are at least willing to) set up firms if and only if the profitability 
condition, (1), holds. 
 
 The Bad Investment: 
 A fraction m2 £ 1 - m1 of the young are traders.  They have access to a project, which 
requires m units of the final good to be invested in period t and generates Rm units of the final 
good in period t+1.  In other words, unlike the entrepreneurs, the traders simply hoard the final 
good for one period to earn the gross return equal to R per unit, without generating any 
employment.  It is in this sense that we shall call their project the “bad” investment. 
 If wt < m, these agents need to borrow by m - wt > 0 to start the project.  If wt > m, they 
can start the project and lend by wt - m > 0.  Hence, their second-period consumption is equal to 
Rm-rt+1(m-wt) as a trader, which is greater than rt+1wt if and only if Credit Cycles, January 22, 2002, 1:57 PM 
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(2) R ‡ rt+1. 
The traders are willing to start their operation if and only if (2) holds. 
 Remarks:  It is possible to give an alternative interpretation to the bad investment.  The 
project done by these agents does not produce any final good; instead it provides these agents 
with the “private” benefits of Rm, which merely satisfies their ego.  These alternative 
interpretations of the project make no difference in the formal analysis.  Nevertheless, it should be 
pointed out that the key distinction between the good and bad is not the extent to which they are 
“productive,” but the extent to which they improve the net worth of the other agents. Nor should 
one interpret the labor intensity of the production as the key distinction between the good and the 
bad investment.  In the present setting, the agents obtain their wealth only through working in the 
first period, and as the workers, they are homogenous.  In reality, of course, there are many 
sectors, the net worth of the agents can improve through profits and the agents can differ in skill 
as workers and in quality as entrepreneurs.  In such a general setting, business investment in a 
labor intensive sector may not necessarily generate more aggregate demand spillovers nor 
improve the net worth of potential entrepreneurs.
 9 
 
 The Borrowing Constraints: 
 The credit market is competitive in the sense that both lenders and borrowers take the 
equilibrium rate, rt+1, given.  It is not competitive, however, in the sense that one may not be able 
to borrow any amount at the equilibrium rate.  The borrowing limit exists because of the 
enforcement problem: the payment is made only when it is the borrower’s interest to do so.  More 
specifically, the entrepreneurs would refuse to honor its payment obligation, rt+1(1-wt), if it is 
greater than the cost of default, which is taken to be a fraction l1 of the gross profit, i.e., l1pt+1.
  
Knowing this, the lender allows the entrepreneurs to borrow only up to l1pt+1/rt+1.  Thus, they 
cannot start their businesses unless 
(3) wt ‡ 1 - l1pt+1/rt+1. 
                                                                            
9It should also be noted that the assumption that the good and bad investment are done by different agents is not 
crucial; one could alternatively assume that all the agents are homogenous and have access to the two types of 
investment.  As long as we assume that no agent can invest both types of the projects simultaneously and the 
creditor can observe the type of the investment made by the borrower, the results would carry over, even though it 
would make the presentation more complicated. Credit Cycles, January 22, 2002, 1:57 PM 
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The entrepreneurs set up their firms, only when both (1) and (3) are satisfied.  Note that (3) 
implies (1) if wt £ 1 - l1 and that (1) implies (3) if wt ‡ 1 - l1.  In other words, the profitability is 
a relevant constraint when wt > 1 - l1, while the repayment problem is a relevant constraint when 
wt < 1 - l1. 
 Likewise, the traders would refuse to honor the payment obligation, rt+1(m-wt), if it is 
greater than the cost of default, which is taken to be a fraction l2 of the gross profit, i.e., l2Rm. 
Knowing this, the lender would allow the traders to borrow only up to l2Rm/rt+1.  Thus, they 
cannot start their operations unless 
(4) wt ‡ m[1 - l2R/rt+1]. 
The traders invest in their operations, only when both (2) and (4) are satisfied. Note that (4) 
implies (2) if wt £ (1 - l2)m and that (2) implies (4) if wt ‡ (1 - l2)m.  Again, the borrowing 
constraint (4) can be binding only if wt £ (1 - l2)m. 
 One interpretation of the default costs is that, in the event of default, the creditors would 
seize a fraction li of the revenue and the borrowers would disappear with only (1 - li) fraction of 
the revenue in their pockets.  More generally, l1 and l2 may be viewed as the effectiveness of the 
repayment enforcement in the two types of credits. If these parameters are equal to one, the 
borrowing constraints, (3) and (4), are never binding.  If these parameters are equal to zero, the 
agents are never able to borrow.  It should also be noted that the two types of investment differ in 
their repayment problems. We are mainly interested in situations where the repayment 
enforcement is severe for the credits extended to trading activities, but not so for those extended 
to business investment.  That is, l1 is equal or sufficiently close to one, while l2 may be 
significantly smaller than one.  The idea is that the default cost is high for business investment, 
because firms need to hire workers and to be operated in the formal sector, which leave enough of 
a paper trail of their activities, making it easy for the creditors to seize their revenue.  On the 
other hand, the default cost is small in the case of trading, because it requires nothing but 
hoarding and stockpiling goods in a hidden place. For much of the following analysis, we will set 
l1 = 1 and drop the subscript from l2 and let l2 = l < 1. This greatly minimizes the notational and 
algebraic burdens, without changing the results fundamentally.  (It will be shown later, in section Credit Cycles, January 22, 2002, 1:57 PM 
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4, that, for any fixed l2 < 1, the results are robust to a small reduction in l1 from l1 = 1.  
Allowing l1 < 1 would be crucial for the extension in section 5.) 
 
 Equilibrium Wage and Business Profit: 
 Let kt+1 £ m1 be the number of young entrepreneurs in period t that start their firms (hence 
equal to the aggregate business investment at the end of period t, as well as to the number of 
active firms in period t+1). Let xt+1 £ m2 be the number of young traders in period t that start their 
operations.  (The aggregate investment they make is thus equal to mxt+1.)  Since only the firms 
hire workers, the labor market equilibrium in period t+1 is nt+1kt+1 =1, from which nt+1 = 1/kt+1.  
Thus, the equilibrium wage rate and the business profit per firm in period t+1 may be expressed as 
functions of kt+1: 
(5) wt+1 = f¢(1/kt+1) ” W(kt+1) 
(6) pt+1 =  p(1/kt+1) = f(1/kt+1) - f¢(1/kt+1)/kt+1 ” P(kt+1), 
where W¢(kt+1) > 0 and P¢(kt+1) < 0. A higher business investment means a high wage and a lower 
profit.  Note that the investment in the business sector, the good investment, creates jobs and 
leads to a higher wage, thereby improving the net worth of the next generation of the agents.  In 
contrast, trading, the bad investment, contributes nothing to the net worth of the next generation.  
Nevertheless, what is essential is that the former generates more aggregate demand spillovers than 
the latter. 
It is straightforward to show that these functions satisfy 
f(1/k)k = kP(k) + W(k), 
kP¢(k) + W¢(k) = 0, 
as the identities.  In addition, we make the following assumptions. 
(A1) There exists K > 0, such that W(K) = K and W(k) > k for all k ˛ (0, K). 
(A2) K < m1. 
(A3) max k ˛[0, K] {W(k) - k} < mm2. 
(A4) lim k ﬁ +0 P(k) = +¥. Credit Cycles, January 22, 2002, 1:57 PM 
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For example, let f(n)= (Kn)
b/b, with K < m1 and 0 < b < 1. Then, (A1), (A2) and (A4) are all 
satisfied. (A3) is also satisfied if K < (mm2)/b(1-b)
(1-b)/b.  (A1) is introduced only to rule out an 
uninteresting case, where the dynamics of kt would converge to zero in the long run.  It will be 
shown later that, if kt ˛ (0, K], ks ˛ (0, K] for all s > t, so that K may be interpreted as the upper 
bound for the number of firms that the economy could ever sustain.  Thus, (A2) means that the 
economy never runs out of the potential supply of the entrepreneurs.  In other words, (A2) 
ensures that it is not the scarcity of the entrepreneurial talents, but the scarcity of the saving and 
of the credit that will drive the dynamics of business formation in this economy.  (A3) may be 
interpreted similarly. It ensures that the aggregate investment in trading is potentially large 
enough, so that there are always some inactive traders in the steady state.
10  It turns out that 
dropping (A3) would not affect the results fundamentally, but would drastically increase the 
number of the cases that need to be examined.  (A4) ensures that some entrepreneurs invest in 
equilibrium, kt+1 > 0. 
 
    The Investment Schedules: 
 Because we have set l1 = 1, the borrowing constraint for the entrepreneurs, (3), is never 
binding, whenever (1) holds, and (1) always holds because of (A4).  If (1) holds with the strict 
inequality, all the entrepreneurs start firms.  If (1) holds with the equality, they are indifferent.  
Therefore, the investment schedule by the entrepreneurs is given simply by the following 
complementarity slackness condition,  
(7) 0 < kt+1 £ m1,   P(kt+1) ‡ rt+1, 
which is illustrated in Figures 1a through 1c.  As shown below, (A1) and (A2) ensure that kt+1 < 
m1 and P(kt+1) = rt+1 in equilibrium.  The investment demand schedule by the entrepreneurs is thus 
downward-sloping in the relevant range.  At a higher interest rate, the gross profit must rise in 
                                                                            
10Note that (A2) and (A3) help to remove the unwanted implication of the assumption that each agent can manage 
at most one project.  This assumption, which reduces the agent’s investment choice to a zero-one decision, is made 
for the analytical simplicity.  Both (A2) and (A3) would not be needed if the agents were allowed to invest at any 
scale, subject only the minimum investment requirement.  It turns out, however, that such an alternative 
specification would make the model algebraic cumbersome.  It should be also noted that these assumptions can be 
weakened significantly.   (A2) can be replaced by W(min{K, kc}) < m1  and (A3) by W(kcc) - kcc < mm2, where kc 
and kcc are the values defined later.  (A2) and (A3) are chosen simply because kc and kcc depends also on R and l2, 
hence the meanings of these alternative assumptions may not be immediately apparent to the reader. Credit Cycles, January 22, 2002, 1:57 PM 
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order to keep business investment profitable, which means that the number of active firms must 
decline. 
 We now turn to the investment schedule by the traders.  First, let us define R(wt) ” 
R/max{(1 - wt/m)/l, 1}, so that 
    lR/[1 - W(kt)/m]  if kt < kl, 
 R(W(kt)) = 
   R    if  kt ‡ kl, 
where kl is defined implicitly by W(kl) ” (1 - l)m.  Figure 2 illustrates the function, R(W(kt)).  If 
rt+1 < R(W(kt)), both (2) and (4) are satisfied with the strict inequality, so that all the traders start 
the trading operation.  If rt+1 > R(W(kt)), at least one of the conditions is violated, so that no one 
starts the trading operation.  A fraction of the traders starts their operation, if and only if rt+1 = 
R(W(kt)).  In words, R(W(kt)) is the interest rate that the traders can afford and credibly commit 
to repay.  Note that R(W(kt)) is constant and equal to R for kt ‡ kl, when the profitability 
constraint, (2), is more stringent than the borrowing  constraint, (4).  On the other hand, it is 
increasing in kt for kt < kl, when the borrowing constraint, (4), is more stringent than the 
profitability constraint, (2).  This is because, with a higher net worth, the traders need to borrow 
less, which means that they can credibly commit to repay at a higher interest rate.  In other words, 
a higher net worth eases the borrowing constraint, so that the interest rate can go up without 
inducing the traders to default. 
 The investment by the traders may thus be expressed as 
   = mm2  if  rt+1 < R(W(kt)), 
(8) mxt+1  ˛ [0, mm2] if  rt+1 = R(W(kt)), 
   = 0  if  rt+1 > R(W(kt)). 
In each of Figures 1a through 1c, eq. (8) is illustrated as a step function, which graphs W(kt) - 
mxt+1. 
 
 The Credit Market Equilibrium: 
 The credit market equilibrium requires that the interest rate adjust so as to equate the 
aggregate investment and the aggregate saving, i.e., kt+1 + mxt+1 = wt , or equivalently  Credit Cycles, January 22, 2002, 1:57 PM 
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(9) kt+1 = W(kt) - mxt+1. 
Figures 1a through 1c illustrate three alternative cases, depending on the value of kt.
11 
Figure 1a depicts the case for kt  < kc, where kc is defined uniquely by  
 R(W(kc)) ” P(W(kc)).   
This is the case where W(kt) is sufficiently low that R(W(kt)) < P(W(kt)).  Thus, the net worth of 
the traders is so low that they cannot finance their investment (xt+1 = 0) and all the savings are 
channeled into the investment in the business sector (kt+1 = W(kt) < m1). The equilibrium interest 
rate is too high for the traders (rt+1  = P(W(kt)) > R(W(kt))).   
Figure 1b depicts the case for kc < kt < kcc, where kcc (> kc) is defined uniquely by 
 R(W(kcc)) ” P(W(kcc)-mm2) 
and satisfies kcc > kc.  Thus, P(W(kt)) < R(W(kt)) < P(W(kt)-mm2) in this case. The equilibrium 
interest rate is equal to rt+1 = R(W(kt)) = P(kt+1) = P(W(kt)-mxt+1) and 0 < xt+1< m2.  In this 
range, some, but not all, traders invest. An increase in kt thus has the effect of further increasing 
the investment in trading. Its effect on business investment depends whether kt is higher or less 
than kl.  If kt > kl, the borrowing constraint of the traders is not binding, so that the interest rate 
is fixed at R(W(kt)) = R.  Thus, the investment in the business sector remains constant at P
-1(R).  
On the other hand, if kt < kl, the borrowing constraint for the traders is binding.  Thus, R(W(kt)) 
increases with kt, because a higher net worth eases the borrowing constraint of the traders, so that 
they can borrow at a higher interest rate.  As a result, the investment in the business sector is 
squeezed out. 
Finally, Figure 1c depicts the case for kt > kcc.  This is the case where W(kt) is sufficiently 
high that R(W(kt)) > P(W(kt)-mm2) = rt+1 , so that xt+1 = m2 and kt+1 = W(kt) - mm2.  Thus, the net 
worth is so high that all the traders invest.  An increase in the saving translates to an increase in 
business investment.  Hence, kt+1 increases with kt in this range.  This situation occurs as an 
unwanted by-product of the assumption that the traders can manage at most one trading 
operation, which was made to simplify the analysis of the trader’s decision problem.  Note, 
                                                                            
11 Figures 1a-1c are drawn under the assumption, W(kt) < m1, which ensures kt+1 < m1 in equilibrium.  This 
assumption will be verified later. These figures are also drawn such that W(kt) > mm2.  In the cases of Figures 1a 
and 1b, this need not be the case, but it does not affect for the discussion in the text. Credit Cycles, January 22, 2002, 1:57 PM 
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however, that we have imposed (A3) to ensure that kt+1 = W(kt)-mm2 < kt in this range, and hence 
that this situation would never occur in the steady state. 
  
 A Digression on Credit Rationing: 
 A remark should be made of the case, where kc < kt < kcc and rt+1 = P(kt+1) = R(W(kt)).  In 
this case, which is shown in Figure 1b, only a fraction of the traders starts their operation.  When 
kt ‡ kl, rt+1 = R holds in equilibrium, and (2) is thus satisfied with equality.  Some traders invest 
while others do not, simply because they are indifferent.  When kt < kl, rt+1 = lR/[1 - W(kt)/m] < 
R, hence (4) is binding, while (2) is satisfied with strict inequality.  In other words, all the traders 
strictly prefer borrowing to invest, rather than lending their net worth to others.  Therefore, the 
equilibrium allocation necessarily involves credit rationing, where a fraction of the traders are 
denied the credit.  Those who denied the credit cannot entice the potential lenders by raising the 
interest, because the lenders would know that the borrowers would default at a higher rate.  It 
should be noted, however, that equilibrium credit rationing occurs in this model due to the 
homogeneity of the traders.  The homogeneity means that, whenever some traders face the 
borrowing constraint, all the traders face the borrowing constraint, so that coin tosses or some 
random devices must be evoked to determine the allocation of the credit.
 12  Suppose instead that 
the traders were heterogeneous in their observable characteristics.  For example, suppose each 
young trader receives, in addition to the labor income, an endowment income, y, which is drawn 
from G, a cumulative distribution function with no mass point.  Then, there would be a critical 
level of y, Y(wt, rt+1) ” m(1 - lR/rt+1) - wt, such that only the traders whose endowment income 
exceed Y(wt, rt+1) would be able to finance their investment.  This makes the aggregate investment 
in trading, mxt+1 = m[1 - G(Y(wt, rt+1))], smoothly decreasing in rt+1, and increasing in wt.  Thus, 
the borrowing constraint would be enough to determine the allocation of the credit, and credit 
                                                                            
12 While some authors use the term, “credit-rationing,” whenever some credit limits exist, here it is used to 
describe the situation that the aggregate supply of credit falls short of the aggregate demand, so that some 
borrowers cannot borrow up to their credit limit.  In other words, there is no credit rationing if every borrower can 
borrow up to its limit.  In such a situation, their borrowing may be constraint by their net worth, which affects the 
credit limit, but not because they are credit-rationed. This is consistent with the following definition of credit 
rationing by Freixas and Rochet (1997, Ch.5), who attributed it to Baltensperger: “some borrower’s demand for 
credit is turned down, even if this borrower is willing to pay all the price and nonprice elements of the loan 
contract.” Credit Cycles, January 22, 2002, 1:57 PM 
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rationing would not occur.  What is essential for the following analysis is that, when the 
borrowing constraint is binding for marginal traders, an increase in the net worth of the traders 
increase the aggregate investment in trading, for a given interest rate.  Therefore, it is the 
borrowing constraint, not the equilibrium credit rationing per se, that matters.  The equilibrium 
credit rationing is nothing but an artifact of the homogeneity assumption, which is imposed to 
simplify the analysis.  
 
 The Equilibrium Trajectory: 
 As should be clear from Figures 1a-1c, kt+1 = W(kt) if and only if kt £ kc; P(kt+1) = 
R(W(kt)) if and only if kc £  kt £ kcc; and kt+1 = W(kt)-mm2 if and only if kt ‡ kcc.  These 
observations can be summarized as follows: 
W(kt)     if kt £ kc,  
(10) kt+1  = Y(kt) ”   P
-1(lR/[1 - W(kt)/m]),  if kc < kt £ min {kl, kcc}, 
    P
-1(R),    if kl < kt £ kcc, 
    W(kt)-mm2    if kt ‡ kcc. 
Equation (10) determines kt+1 uniquely as a function of kt. From (9) and the monotonicity of W, kt 
˛ (0, K] implies that kt+1 = Y(kt) ˛ (0, W(kt)] ￿ (0, W(K)] = (0, K].  Therefore, Y maps (0,K] 
into itself, and hence, for any k0 ˛ (0, K], this map defines a unique trajectory in (0, K].  
Furthermore, kt £ K and (A2) mean that m1 > K = W(K) ‡ W(kt), as has been assumed. 
 The equilibrium trajectory of the economy can thus be solved for by applying the map 
(10), Y, iteratively, starting with the initial condition, k0 ˛ (0, K].  This completes the description 
of the model.  We now turn to the characterization of the equilibrium dynamics. 
 
3. The Dynamic Analysis. 
 It turns out that there are five generic cases of the equilibrium dynamics, as illustrated by 
Figure 3a through Figure 3e.
 13  Figure 3a depicts the case, where the traders never become 
active, and kt+1 = W(kt) for all kt ˛ (0, K].  Hence, kt converges monotonically to k* = K for any 
                                                                            
13 Figure 3a through Figure 3e are drawn such that W(0) = 0 and W is concave.  These need not be the case.  (A1) 
assumes only that W(k) > k for all k ˛ (0, K] and W(K) = K. Credit Cycles, January 22, 2002, 1:57 PM 
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k0 ˛ (0,K], from the monotonicity of W and (A1).  The condition for this is kc ‡ K, or 
equivalently, P(K) ‡ R(W(K)) = R(K), which can be further rewritten to 
(11) R £ P(K) max{(1 - K/m)/l, 1}. 
With a sufficiently small R (i.e., if trading is not very profitable), trading never competes with 
business investment for the credit.  When W(K) = K < m, the condition (11) is also met when l is 
sufficiently small for any R.  This is because the traders must borrow to start their operations even 
when the net worth reaches its highest possible value.  If l is sufficiently small, they can never 
borrow, and hence they can never invest, and hence all the saving goes to business investment. 
 In the other four cases, (11) is violated, so that kc < K.  Thus, some traders are active (i.e., 
xt+1 > 0) when kt ˛ (kc , K].  Figure 3b depicts the case, where kl £ kc  or equivalently, W(kc) ‡ (1 
- l)m, which can be rewritten as to 
(12) R £ P((1 - l)m). 
Under this condition, W(kt) > (1 - l)m and R(W(kt)) = R for all kt > kc.  This means that the 
borrowing constraint is not binding for the traders, whenever they are active.  Thus, from eq. 
(10), 
    W(kt),   if kt £ kc 
(13)  kt+1 = Y(kt) =    P
-1(R) = W(kc), if kc < kt £ min{kcc, K} 
    W(kt) - mm2.   if kcc < kt £ K. 
As shown in Figure 3b, the map has a flat segment, over (kc , min{kcc, K}), but it is strictly 
increasing elsewhere.  Furthermore, (A3) ensures kcc > W(kcc) - mm2, so that the steady state is 
located at the flat segment.
14  The dynamics of kt hence converges monotonically to the unique 
steady state, k* = P
-1(R) = W(kc).  As the business sector expands, the return for business 
investment declines and the net worth improves, and eventually the traders start investing.  
However, because the traders do not face the binding borrowing constraint, the equilibrium 
interest rate is always equal to R.  Thus, business investment remains constant at P
-1(R) and an 
increase in trading activities does not reduce business investment.  
 In the three cases depicted by Figure 3c through 3e, W(kc) < (1 - l)m, or kc < kl, so that 
there is an interval, kt ˛ (kc , kl), in which the borrowing constraint is more stringent than the Credit Cycles, January 22, 2002, 1:57 PM 
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profitability constraint for the traders.  For kc < kt < min {kl, kcc, K}, the borrowing constraint is 
binding, and  
(14) kt+1 = Y(kt) = P
-1(lR/[1 - W(kt)/m]),  
which is decreasing in kt. Thus, with the failure of both (11) and (12), the map has a downward 
sloping segment. For kl < kt < min {kcc, K}, the borrowing constraint is not binding, and hence 
kt+1 = Y(kt) = P
-1(R), so that Y(kt) is constant. 
 The reason why an increase in kt leads to a lower kt+1 when the traders face the binding 
borrowing constraint should be clear. A higher kt, by improving the net worth of the traders, eases 
their borrowing constraint.  This drives up the equilibrium interest rate.  To keep the investment in 
the business sector profitable, the number of active firms in the business sector must decline.  
Thus, more saving is channeled into the investment in trading at the expense of the investment in 
the business sector. 
Figure 3c depicts the case where the borrowing constraint for trading is not binding in the 
steady state.  That is, the map intersects with the 45￿ line at a flat segment, i.e., over the interval, 
(kl, min{kcc, K}).   The condition for this is kl £ k* = P
-1(R) < kcc. Since (A3) ensures k* < kcc, 
this occurs whenever kl £ P
-1(R), or equivalently, W(P
-1(R)) ‡ (1 - l)m, which can be further 
rewritten to 
(15) R £ P(W
-1((1 - l)m)). 
When (15) holds but (11) and (12) are violated, the dynamics of kt converges to k* = P
-1(R) < 
W(kc), as illustrated in Figure 3c.  The dynamics is not, however, globally monotone. Starting 
from k0 < kl, the dynamics of kt generally overshoots k* and approaches k* from above.
15 
For the cases depicted by Figures 3d and 3e, (11) and (15) are both violated, which also 
implies the violation of (12).
16  Thus, the map intersects with the 45￿ line at the downward sloping 
part, (kc , min{kl, kcc, K}).  Therefore, the traders face the binding borrowing constraint in a 
neighborhood of the steady state.  By setting kt = kt+1 = k* in (14), the steady state is given by 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
14In both Figures 3b and 3c, kcc > K.  This need not be the case, nor is it essential for the discussion in the text. 
15 The qualified “generally” is needed, because the equilibrium trajectory is monotone, if k0 ˛ {W
--T(k*)‰T = 0, 1, 
2,...}, which is at most countable and hence of measure zero.   
16 Figures 3d and 3e are drawn such that kl < K.  This need not be the case, nor is it essential for the discussion in 
the text. Credit Cycles, January 22, 2002, 1:57 PM 
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(16) P(k*)[1 - W(k*)/m] = lR. 
 Figure 3d and Figure 3e differ in the stability of the steady state, which depends on the 
slope of the map at k*.  By Differentiating (14) and then setting kt = kt+1 = k* yield, 
 Y¢(k*) = W¢(k*)P(k*)/P¢(k*)[m - W(k*)] = - k*P(k*)/[m - W(k*)], 
where use has been made of (16) and W¢(k*)+k*P¢(k*) = 0.  From k*P(k*) + W(k*) = 
k*f(1/k*), ‰Y¢(k*)‰ < 1 if and only if 
(17) k*f(1/k*) < m. 
Note that the LHS of (17) is increasing in k*, while the LHS of (16) is decreasing in k*.  Hence, 
(17) can be rewritten to 
(18) lR > P(h(m))[1 - W(h(m))/m], 
where h(m) is defined implicitly by hf(1/h) ” m.  This case is illustrated in Figure 3d. When (18) 
holds, the steady state, k*, is asymptotically stable; the convergence is locally oscillatory. 
 On the other hand, if 
(19) lR < P(h(m))[1 - W(h(m))/m], 
then ‰Y¢(k*)‰ > 1 and hence the steady state, k*, is unstable, as illustrated in Figure 3e.  For any 
initial condition, the equilibrium trajectory will eventually be trapped in the interval, I ” 
[max{Y(W(kc)), Y(min{kl, kcc})}, W(kc)], as illustrated by the box in Figure 3e.
17  Furthermore, 
if kl ‡ min{kcc, K}, kt fluctuates indefinitely except for a countable set of initial conditions.  If kl 
< min{kcc, K}, kt fluctuates indefinitely except for a countable set of initial conditions for a 
generic subset of the parameter values satisfying (19) and violating (11) and (15).
18  In other 
words, the equilibrium dynamics exhibit permanent endogenous fluctuations almost surely.   
 To summarize, 
                                                                            
17 In Figure 3e, kl < W(kc) < K < kcc.  Hence, I = [Y(kl), W(kc)] = [P
-1(R), W(kc)]. 
18 To see this, let C ￿ (0, K] be the set of initial conditions for which kt converges.  Let k¥ = lim tﬁ¥  Y
t(k0) be the 
limit point for k0 ˛ C.  From the continuity of Y, Y(k¥) = lim tﬁ¥ Y(kt) = lim tﬁ¥  kt+1 = k¥.  Hence, k¥ = k*.  
Since k* is unstable, kt cannot approach it asymptotically.  It must be mapped to k* in a finite iteration.  That is, 
there exits T such that Y
T(k0) = k*, or C = {Y
-T(k0)‰T = 0,1,2,...}.  If kl ‡ min{kcc, K}, the map has no flat 
segment and hence the preimage of Y is finite and hence C is at most countable.  If kl < min{kcc, K}, the map has 
a flat segment, at which it is equal to P
-1(R).  Thus, C is at most countable unless P
-1(R) ˛ {Y
-T(k0)‰T = 
0,1,2,...}, which occurs only for a nongeneric set of parameter values.  (As clear from this proof, it is easy to show 
that, even when kl < min{kcc, K}, if W(kc) < min{kl, kcc}, the flat segment does not belong to I.  Hence, if we 
restrict the initial condition in I, kt fluctuates indefinitely for almost initial conditions in I for all the parameter 
values satisfying (19) and violate (11) and (15).) Credit Cycles, January 22, 2002, 1:57 PM 
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Proposition 1. Let l1 = 1 and l2 = l ˛ (0,1).  Then, 
A. Let R £ P(K)max{(1 - K/m)/l, 1}.  Then, xt+1 = 0 for all t ‡ 0 and the dynamics of kt 
converges monotonically to the unique steady state, K. 
B. Let P(K) < R £ P((1 - l)m).  Then, the dynamics of kt converges monotonically to the 
unique steady state, k* = P
-1(R) = W(kc).  Some traders eventually become active and 
never face the binding borrowing constraint. 
C. Let P((1 - l)m) < R £ P(W
-1((1 - l)m))).  Then, the dynamics of kt converges to the 
unique steady state, k* = P
-1(R) < W(kc).  Some traders are active and do not face the 
binding borrowing constraint in the steady state. 
D. Let R > P(W
-1((1 - l)m))), P(h(m))[1 - W(h(m))/m]/l.  Then, the dynamics of k has the 
unique steady state, k* ˛ (kc , min{kl, kcc, K}), satisfying P(k*)[1 - W(k*)/m] = lR.  The 
traders face the binding borrowing constraint in the steady state.  The steady state is 
asymptotically stable.  The convergence is locally oscillatory. 
E. Let P(K)(1 - K/m)/l, P(W
-1((1 - l)m))) < R < P(h(m))[1 - W(h(m))/m]/l. Then, the 
dynamics of k has the unique steady state, k*˛ (kc , min{kl, kcc, K}), satisfying P(k*)[1 - 
W(k*)/m] = lR.  The traders face the binding borrowing constraint in the steady state.  
The steady state is unstable.  Every equilibrium trajectory will be eventually trapped in the 
interval, I ” [max{Y(W(kc)), Y(min{kl, kcc})}, W(kc)].  Furthermore, the equilibrium 
dynamics exhibits permanent, endogenous fluctuations almost surely. 
 
Figures 4a through 4c illustrate Proposition 1 in terms of the three parameters that 
characterize the trading operation, m, l, and R. In Figure 4a, m < K; In Figure 4b, K < m < 
Kf(1/K); and in Figure 4c for m > Kf(1/K).
19  In these figures, the parameter space, (l, R), is 
divided into four or five regions, where Region A satisfies the conditions given in Proposition 1A, 
                                                                            
19 Note Kf(1/K) = KP(K) + W(K) > W(K) = K for any K, which verifies the existence of the case depicted in 
Figure 4b.  To see that none of these parameter configurations contradicts with the assumptions made so far, recall 
the example, f(n)= (Kn)
b/b, with 0 < b < 1, K < m1, and K < (mm2)/b(1-b)
(1-b)/b, which satisfy (A1) through (A4).  
With this functional form, Kf(1/K)= K/b.   Thus, if 1-m1  ‡ m2 > b(1-b)
(1-b)/b, Figure 4a applies for m < K < min 
{m1, (mm2)/b(1-b)
(1-b)/b}, Figure 4b for  bm < K < min {m1, m}, and Figure 4c for K < min {m1, bm}. Credit Cycles, January 22, 2002, 1:57 PM 
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Region B satisfies those given in Proposition 1B, etc.  The borders between B and C and those 
between C and D in Figures 4a through 4c are asymptotic to l = 1.  The borders between D and 
E in Figures 4a and 4b, the border between A and E in Figure 4b and the border between A and D 
in Figure 4c are hyperbolae and asymptotic to l = 0. 
 Figure 4a depicts the case, m < K, hence the minimum investment is sufficiently small that, 
if all the saving were to go to the business sector, the traders would eventually become rich 
enough to be able to finance their investment without borrowing from the credit market.  In this 
case, if R < P(W
-1(m)), they do not face the binding borrowing constraint in the steady state, 
regardless of l.   If R > P(W
-1(m)), however, the economy is in either Region D or Region E for 
a sufficiently small l (i.e., 0 < l < 1 - W(P
-1(R))/m), and the traders face the binding borrowing 
constraint in the steady state.  Starting in a neighborhood of the steady state, an improvement in 
the net worth eases their borrowing constraint, which pushes the equilibrium interest rate, thereby 
causing a decline in business investment, which reduces the net worth of the agents in the next 
period.  Indeed, a sufficiently small l ensures that the economy is in Region E, where this effect is 
so strong that the steady state becomes unstable, and generates endogenous fluctuations.  
(Technically speaking, as the economy crosses lR = P(h(m))[1 - W(h(m))/m] from Region D to 
Region E, the dynamical system experiences a flip bifurcation.) 
 This does not necessarily mean that fluctuations would be more likely to occur with a 
greater imperfection of the credit market.  Figure 4b depicts the case for an intermediate value of 
m, the case where the minimum investment is sufficiently high that the agents need to borrow 
from the credit market to invest in trading (m > K).  Therefore, trading never occurs for a 
sufficiently small l.  For any R > P(K), Region D and Region E exist for an intermediate range of 
l.  That is, the credit market imperfection must be sufficiently high, but cannot be too severe for 
endogenous fluctuations to occur.  In Figure 4c, when the minimum investment is very high, 
Region E no longer exists.  The following corollary of Proposition 1 summarizes the condition for 
endogenous fluctuations. 
 
Corollary 1. Credit Cycles, January 22, 2002, 1:57 PM 
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Suppose 0 < m < K.  For any R > P(W
-1(m)), endogenous fluctuations occur (almost surely) for 
a sufficiently small l > 0. Suppose K < m < Kf(1/K).  For any R > P(K), endogenous 
fluctuations occur (almost surely) for an intermediate value of l. 
 
Region D is also of some interest, because the local convergence toward the steady state is 
oscillatory, and the transitional dynamics is cyclical.  If the economy is hit by recurrent shocks, the 
equilibrium dynamics exhibit considerable fluctuations.
20  A quick look at Figure 4a through 4c, 
verifies that a sufficiently high R ensures that the economy is in Region D.  Thus, 
 
Corollary 2. 
For any l ˛ (0,1), the dynamics around the steady state is oscillatory for a sufficiently high R. 
 
The intuition behind this result is easy to grasp.  Whenever the repayment enforcement is 
imperfect, the trader would face the binding borrowing constraint around the steady state, if the 
traders are sufficiently eager to invest, i.e., if the trading operation is sufficiently productive. 
 Propositions 1D and 1E give the conditions under which the model generates oscillatory 
convergence and endogenous fluctuations, respectively.  Without a specific functional form, 
however, little more can be said about the nature of global dynamics.  Therefore, let us turn to  
some examples. 
 
 Example 1: 
Let f(n)= 2(Kn)
1/2, with K < m1, 4mm2, which satisfies (A1) through (A4).  If R > K/(1-l)m, and 
R > (1- K/m)/l, the economy is either in Region D (for lR > K/m) or in Region E (for lR < 
K/m).  Furthermore, in order to avoid a taxonomical exposition, let us focus on the case, where 
W(kc) < min {kl,  kcc} so that the map is strictly decreasing in (kc, W(kc)].
21  Some algebra can 
                                                                            
20 In addition, it is possible that there may be endogenous fluctuations in Region D.  When the parameters satisfy 
the conditions given in Proposition 1D, we do know that the local dynamics converges, but little can be said of the 
nature of global dynamics.  For example, there are (unstable) period-2 cycles in the neighborhood of k* near the 
boundary on the side of Region D, if the flip bifurcation that occurs at the boundary of D and E is of subcritical 
type: see Guckenheimer and Holmes (1983, Theorem 3.5.1). 
21 For example, K < (1-l)m(1-l+lR) ensures kl > W(kc); K > mR
2(1-l-m2 ) ensures kcc > kl , hence kcc > W(kc). Credit Cycles, January 22, 2002, 1:57 PM 
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show that, by defining zt ” (kt/K)
1/2
, the equilibrium dynamics over this range can be expressed by 
the map: y: (0, y(zc)]ﬁ (0, zc], defined by 
zt+1 = y(zt) ” min {zt
1/2
 , [1 - (K/m)zt]/(lR)}, 
where zc ” (kc/K)
1/2 < 1, which satisfies y(zc) = zc
1/2
 = [1 - (K/m)zc]/(lR).  The map is unimodal: 
it is strictly increasing in (0, zc) and strictly decreasing in I- ” (zc, y(zc)].   Furthermore, the slope 
is constant in I-.  In Region D, where lR > K/m, the slope in I- is less than one in absolute value.  
Therefore, the economy converges to the steady state, z* = 1/(lR+K/m) ˛ I-, for any initial 
condition.  In Region E, the case illustrated in Figure 5a, the slope in I- is greater than one in 
absolute value.  This means that, if zt „ z*, the equilibrium trajectory will escape I- after a finite 
iteration.  However, it will never leave I = [y
2(zc), y(zc)], because the map is strictly increasing in 
I+ ” [y
2(zc), zc).  Therefore, the equilibrium trajectory visits both I+ and I- infinitely often, for 
almost all initial conditions in I (i.e., except for a countable set of initial conditions in I, for which 
the equilibrium trajectory is mapped into z* in a finite iteration). Furthermore, if lR > 2(1 - 
K/4m), then zc < 1/4, which ensures that the slope of the map is strictly greater than one in 
absolute value anywhere in I+ ¨ I-.
22  This means that there are period cycles of every period 
length, all of which are unstable, and the equilibrium trajectory does not converge to any periodic 
cycle for almost all initial conditions.  In short, the map is chaotic.
23 
 
 In the previous example, the functional form is chosen so that the slope of the map is 
constant when zt > zc.  This guarantees that there exist no periodic cycles that stay entirely above 
zc. In the next example, the functional form is chosen so that the slope of the map is constant also 
when zt < zc. 
 
 Example 2: 
                                                                            
22 For example, m1 = 0.2, m2 = 0.8, K = 0.1, m =  0.05, l = 0.25, R = 7.8 satisfy the last condition, as well as all the 
other conditions imposed earlier. 
23 See, for example, Devaney (1987, Chapter 1.6 and 1.7).  The set of initial conditions for which the trajectory is 
eventually periodic is a Cantor set, i.e., it is uncountable, but contains no interior or isolated points.  Furthermore, 
this chaotic map is structually stable.  (For introductions to the chaotic dynamical system written for economists, 
see Grandmont 1986 and Baumol and Benhabib 1989). Credit Cycles, January 22, 2002, 1:57 PM 
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Let  f(n) = 2(Kn)
1/2 if n £ 1/kc ; = 2(zc)
-1/2 + log(kcn)/zc, if n > 1/kc, which satisfies (A1) through 
(A4) with K < m1, 4mm2. As in Example 1, let R > K/(1-l)m, and R > (1- K/m)/l, so that the 
economy is either in Region D (for lR > K/m) or in Region E (for lR < K/m), and impose the 
same restrictions on the parameters to ensure W(kc) < min {kl,  kcc}.  Then, the dynamics is now 
given by 
 zt+1 = y(zt) ” min {(zc)
-1/2zt , [1 - (K/m)zt]/(lR)}, 
on (0, y(zc)], as illustrated in Figure 5b.  This map differs from Example 1 in that the slope of the 
map is constant in (0, zc), which is greater than one because zc < 1.  Therefore, for lR < K/m, the 
slope of the map is greater than one in absolute value anywhere in I+ ¨ I-.  Thus, with this 
functional form, the map is chaotic whenever the parameters satisfy the conditions in Proposition 
1E. 
 
4. Reintroducing the Borrowing Constraint in the Business Sector 
 So far, we have analyzed the equilibrium trajectory under the assumption that l1 = 1 > l2 
= l.  We are now going to show that, for any l2 = l < 1, a small reduction in l1 from l1 = 1 
would not affect the equilibrium trajectory. 
 When l1 < 1, the entrepreneurs start firms when both (1) and (3) are satisfied. (A4) 
ensures that some entrepreneurs are active, kt+1 > 0, hence both (1) and (3) hold in equilibrium.  
Furthermore, kt £ K ensures that kt+1 = W(kt) - mxt+1 £ W(kt) £ W(K) = K < m1 .  Therefore, at 
least (1) or (3) must be binding, hence  
(20) P(kt+1)/max{[1 - W(kt)]/l1, 1} = rt+1 .    
The credit market equilibrium is given by (8), (9) and (20).  It is easy to see that, given kt, these 
equations jointly determine kt+1 uniquely.   
 Let us find the condition under which the map given in eq. (10) solves the credit market 
equilibrium, determined by (8), (9), and (20).  First, for any kt ‡ kc, eq. (10) solves the credit 
market equilibrium if and only if the entrepreneurs do not face the binding borrowing constraint, 
that is, when (20) is P(kt+1) = rt+1, i.e., W(kt) ‡ 1 - l1 for all kt ‡ kc.  The condition for this is l1 ‡ Credit Cycles, January 22, 2002, 1:57 PM 
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1 - W(kc).  Then, in order for (10) to be the equilibrium, it suffices to show that xt+1 = 0 and kt+1 = 
W(kt) solve (8), (9) and (20) for kt < kc.  This condition is given by 
       l1P(W(kt))/[1 - W(kt)]  if  kt < kl1 
(21) R/max{[1 - W(kt)/m]/l2, 1} £ 
      P(W(kt))     if kl1 £ kt < kc, 
where kl1 is defined implicitly by W(kl1) ” 1 - l1 and satisfies kl1 < kc.  Eq. (21) is illustrated by 
Figure 6a (for kc < kl) and Figure 6b (for kc > kl).  By definition of kc, the LHS of (21) is strictly 
less than P(W(kt)) for all kt < kc.  Since the RHS of (21) converges to P(W(kt)), as l1 
approaches one, there exists l1¢ < 1 such that eq. (21) holds for l1 ˛ [l1¢ , 1].  Since the LHS of 
(21) weakly increases with l2, the lowest value of l1 for which (21) holds, l1¢, is weakly 
increasing in l2. It is also easy to see that (21) is violated for a sufficiently small l1, hence, l1¢ > 
0.  Furthermore, for any l1 > 0, (21) holds for a sufficiently small l2 > 0.  Thus, l1¢ approaches 
zero with l2.  One can thus conclude 
 
Proposition 2. 
For any l2 = l ˛ (0,1), there exists L(l2) ˛ (0,1), such that, for l1 ˛ [L(l2), 1], the equilibrium 
dynamics is independent of l1.
24  L is nondecreasing in l2 and satisfies L(l2) ‡ 1 - W(kc), and 
liml2ﬁ0 L(l2) = 0. 
 
Proposition 2 thus means that the analysis need not be changed, as long as l1 is sufficiently high. 
In particular, Proposition 1, their corollaries, as well as Examples 1 and 2 are all unaffected. 
Even with a weaker condition on l1, the possibility of endogenous fluctuations survives. 
When l1 < L(l2), the map depends on l1, but shifts continuously as l1 changes. Therefore, as 
long as the reduction is small enough, k* is unaffected and remains the only steady state of the 
map.  Therefore, as long as l2 = l  satisfies the condition given in Proposition 1E, the map 
generates endogenous fluctuations, because its unique steady state is unstable. 
                                                                            
24 The function, L, also depends on other parameters of the model, m, R, K, as well as the functional form of f. Credit Cycles, January 22, 2002, 1:57 PM 
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The above analysis thus shows that the key mechanism in generating endogenous 
fluctuations is that an improved economic condition eases the borrowing constraints for the bad 
investment more than those for the good investment, so that the saving is channeled into the 
former at the expense of the latter.  The assumption made earlier that the good investment faces 
no borrowing constraint itself is not crucial for the results obtained so far. 
 The analysis in this section, nevertheless, provides a caution when interpreting Proposition 
1.  In Proposition 1, it is shown that a sufficiently high l2 = l eliminates the possibility of 
endogenous fluctuations.  From this, one should not jump to the conclusion that endogenous 
fluctuations would disappear with an improvement of the credit market. When l1 < 1, an 
improvement could mean not only a higher l2 but also a higher l1, so that the unique steady state 
could very well remain unstable. 
 
5. The Good, The Bad and The Ugly: Introducing Credit Multiplier 
 This section presents an extension of the above model, which serves two purposes. 
First, recent studies in macroeconomics, such as Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and Kiyotaki and 
Moore (1997), have emphasized the role of imperfect credit markets in propagation mechanisms 
of business cycles.  In particular, they stressed a credit multiplier effect.  An increase in the net 
worth stimulates business investment by easing the borrowing constraint of the entrepreneurs, 
which further improves their net worth, leading to more business investment.  This introduces 
persistence into the system.  The model developed above has no such a credit multiplier effect.
25  
Quite the contrary, the mechanism identified may be called a credit reversal effect, because an 
increase in the net worth stimulates trading at the expense of business investment, leading to a 
deterioration of the net worth.  This introduces instability into the system.  This does not mean, 
however, that these two mechanisms are mutually exclusive.  Combining the two is not only 
feasible but also useful because it adds some realism to the equilibrium dynamics.  In the model 
shown below, both multiplier and reversal effects of imperfect credit markets are present and the 
                                                                            
25 In the model above, an increase in the net worth leads to an increase in business investment when kt  < kc.  This 
occurs because an increase in the net worth leads to an increase in the aggregate savings, all of which are used to 
finance the investment in the business sector.  The aggregate investment in the business sector is independent of 
whether the entrepreneurs face the borrowing constraint.  Therefore, it should not be interpreted as the credit 
multiplier effect. Credit Cycles, January 22, 2002, 1:57 PM 
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equilibrium dynamics exhibit persistence at a low level of economic activities and instability at a 
high level. 
 Second, in the model developed above, the only alternative to business investment, 
trading, not only generates less aggregate demand spillovers than the other, but also faces tighter 
borrowing constraints.  This might give the reader a false impression that it would be necessary to 
have these two features, less spillovers and tighter borrowing constraints, must go together to 
have instability and fluctuations.  The extension presented below will show that this need not be 
the case, by adding another investment opportunity, which generates less spillovers and face less 
borrowing constraints.  What is needed for endogenous fluctuations is that some projects that 
have less spillovers than business investment are high profitable, and yet can be financed only at at 
a high level of economic activities. 
 The model discussed in the last section is now modified to allow the young agents to have 
access to a storage technology, which transforms one unit of the final good in period t into r units 
of the final good in period t+1. The storage technology is divisible and available to all the young, 
even when their net worth is low. It is assumed that the gross rate of return on storage satisfies r 
˛ (l2R, R).  This restriction ensures that storage dominates trading when the net worth is low, 
while trading dominates storage when the net worth is high.  That is, the economy now has the 
following three types of the investment: i) The Good (Business Investment), which creates jobs 
and is relatively easy to finance; ii) The Bad (Trading), which is profitable but creates no jobs and 
is difficult to finance; and iii) The Ugly (Storage), which is unprofitable and creates no jobs, but 
has no problem of financing. 
 Let st be the total units of the final good invested in storage at the end of period t.  Then, 
the credit market equilibrium condition is now given by  
   = mm2  if  rt+1 < R(W(kt)), 
(8) mxt+1  ˛ [0, mm2] if  rt+1 = R(W(kt)), 
   = 0  if  rt+1 > R(W(kt)). 
(20) P(kt+1)/max{[1 - W(kt)]/l1, 1} = rt+1 .    
  = 0, if rt+1  > r 
(22) st  ‡ 0, if rt+1  = r Credit Cycles, January 22, 2002, 1:57 PM 
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  = ¥, if rt+1  < r 
(23) kt+1 = W(kt) - mxt+1 - st. 
Here, (8) and (20) are reproduced for easy reference.  Introducing the storage technology does 
not make any difference in the range where rt+1 > r.  If the storage technology is used in 
equilibrium, the equilibrium interest rate must be rt+1 = r. 
 Characterizing the credit market equilibrium and the equilibrium trajectory determined by 
(8), (20), (22) and (23) for a full set of parameter values require one to go through a large number 
of cases.  Furthermore, in many of these cases, the presence of the storage technology does not 
affect the properties of the equilibrium dynamics fundamentally.  In what follows, let us focus on a 
representative case, in which the introduction of the storage technology creates some important 
changes.  More specifically, let us consider the case, where the following conditions hold.  First, R 
and l2 = l satisfy the conditions given in Proposition 1E.  This ensures that kc < k* < kl.  Second, 
r is not too low nor too high so that kc < kr < k*, where kr is implicitly defined by R(W(kr)) ” r.  
Third, l1 is large enough that kl1 < kr, and small enough that the RHS of (21) is greater than r 
for kt < k¢ and smaller than r for kt > k¢. (It is feasible to find such l1 because kc < kr.)  These 
conditions are illustrated in Figure 7.
26 
   Then, for kt < k¢, the business profit is so high that all the saving goes to the investment in 
the business sector, and xt+1 = st = 0.  For k¢ < kt < kr, some saving goes to the storage, st > 0, and 
hence rt+1  = r  > R(W(kt)), and the trading remains inactive, xt+1 = 0.  Within this range, the 
borrowing constraint is binding for the entrepreneurs when k¢ < kt < kl1, and the profitability 
constraint is binding for the entrepreneurs when kl1 < kt < kr. For kr < kt < min {kl, kcc, K}, the 
storage technology is not used, st = 0. The entrepreneurs, whose borrowing constraint is not 
binding, compete for the credit with the traders who become active, and face the binding 
borrowing constraint, and the interest is given by rt+1  = R(W(kt)) > r.   The unstable steady state, 
k*, shown in Proposition 1E, is located in this range. 
 The equilibrium dynamics is thus governed by the following map: 
    W(kt),    if kt £ k¢, 
     P
-1(r[1 - W(kt)]/l1),   if k¢ < kt £ kl1, Credit Cycles, January 22, 2002, 1:57 PM 
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(24) kt+1 = Y(kt) ”  P
-1(r),    if kl1 < kt £ kr. 
     P
-1(l2R/[1 - W(kt)/m]),  if kr < kt £ min {kl, kcc}, 
    P
-1(R),    if kl < kt £ kcc, 
    W(kt) - mm2.    if kt ‡ kcc, 
where k¢ is given implicitly by l1P(W(k¢))/[1 - W(k¢)] ” r.  Eq. (24) differs from (10) for k¢ < kt 
< kr, where some saving go to the storage technology and the interest rate is fixed at r.  In 
particular, for k¢ < kt < kl1, the investment in the business sector is determined by the borrowing 
constraint,   
(25) W(kt) = 1 - l1P(kt+1)/r. 
In this range, an increase in the net worth, W(kt), eases the borrowing constraint of the 
entrepreneurs, so that their investment demand goes up.  Instead of pushing the equilibrium 
interest rate, the rise in the investment demand in the business sector is financed by redirecting  
the savings from storage.  Intuitively enough, an increase in r/l1 shifts down the map in this 
range.  The presence of the ugly investment thus reduces the good investment, which slows down 
expansion processes.  Unlike the bad investment, however, the ugly investment does not destroy 
the good investment.  And a higher business investment today leads to a higher business 
investment tomorrow.  This mechanism is essentially identical with the one studied by Bernanke 
and Gertler (1989).  
 The crucial feature of the dynamics governed by (24) is that the credit multiplier effect is 
operative at a lower level of activities, while the credit reversal effect is operative at a higher level, 
including in the neighborhood of the unstable steady state, k*.  In this sense, this model is a hybrid 
of the model developed earlier and of a credit multiplier model à la Bernanke-Gertler. 
 Figure 8 illustrates the map (24) under additional restrictions, Y(kr) = P
-1(r) £ min {kl, 
kcc} and kl1 > Y
2(kr) = Y(P
-1(r)).  The first restriction ensures that some traders remain inactive 
at Y(kr).  This means that the trapping interval is given by I ” [Y




27  The second restriction ensures that the trapping interval, I, overlaps with (k¢, kl1), i.e., 
the range over which the credit multiplier effect is operative.  Let us fix r and change l1.  As l1 is 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
26 In Figure 7, kl1 < kc.  This need not be the case, nor is it essential for the discussion in the text. Credit Cycles, January 22, 2002, 1:57 PM 
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reduced, kl1 increases from Y
2(kr) to kr, and at the same time, the map shifts down below kl1.  
Clearly, the map has the unique steady state, k*, as long as l1 is not too small (or kl1 is 
sufficiently close to Y
2(kr)).  As l1 is made smaller (and kl1 approaches kr), the equilibrium 
dynamics may have additional steady states in (k¢, kl1).
28  The following proposition gives the 
exact condition under which that happens. 
 
Proposition 3.  Let k* be the (unstable) steady state in Proposition 1E. 
A. If l1 < 1 - W(h(1)) and l1 < rh(1), the equilibrium dynamics governed  by (24) has, in 
addition to k*, two other steady states, k1**, k2** ˛ (k¢, kl1).  They satisfy k1** < h(1) < k2**,  
and k1** is stable and k2** is unstable. 
B. If l1 < 1 - W(h(1)) and l1 = rh(1), the equilibrium dynamics governed by (24) has, in 
addition to k*, another steady state, k** = h(1) ˛ (k¢, kl1), which is stable from below and 
unstable from above. 
C. Otherwise, k* is the unique steady state of (24). 
 
Proof.  See Appendix. 
 
If l1 > 1 - W(h(1)) or l1 > rh(1), neither condition given in Proposition 3A or 3B hold, 
endogenous fluctuations clearly survive, because the map has a unique steady state, k*, which is 
unstable.  Even if l1 < 1 - W(h(1)) and l1 £ rh(1), the equilibrium dynamics may still exhibit 
endogenous fluctuations in I ” [Y
2(kr), Y(kr)].  This is because, if h(1) < Y
2(kr), k2** < Y
2(kr) 
as long as l1 is not too much lower than rh(1), and hence the map has a unique steady state in I, 
k*, which is unstable, and, for any initial condition in I, the equilibrium trajectory never leaves I.  
 The above argument indicates that, as long as l1 is not too small (or r is not too large), 
the introduction of the credit multiplier effect does not affect the result that the borrowing-
constrained investment in trading generates endogenous fluctuations.  This does not mean, 
however, that the credit multiplier effect has little effects on the nature of fluctuations.  The 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
27 Note that this restriction is weaker than the restriction, W(kc) £ min {kl, kcc}, because kc < kr implies P(W(kc)) 
= R(W(kc)) < R(W(kr)) = r, hence W(kc)  > P
-1(r). Credit Cycles, January 22, 2002, 1:57 PM 
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introduction of the credit multiplier effect, by shifting down the map below kl1, can slow down an 
economic expansion, thereby creating asymmetry in business cycles.  This is most clearly 
illustrated by Figure 9, which depicts the case where Y
2(kr) < h(1) < kl1.  If l1 = rh(1), as 
indicated in Proposition 3B, the map is tangent to the 45￿ line at h(1), which creates an additional 
steady state, k** = h(1).  It is stable from below but unstable from above, and there are 
homoclinic orbits, which leave from k**, and converges to k** from below.  Starting from this 
situation, let l1 go up slightly.  As indicated  in Proposition 3A, such a change in the parameter 
value makes the steady state, k**, disappear, and the map is left with the unique steady state, k*, 
in its downward-sloping segment, which is unstable.  (Technically speaking, this is known as a 
saddle-node or tangent bifurcation.)  The credit multiplier effect is responsible for the segment, 
where the map is increasing and stays above but very close to the 45￿ line. Thus, the equilibrium 
dynamics display intermittency, as a tangent bifurcation eliminates the tangent point, k**, and its 
homoclinic orbits.  The equilibrium trajectory occasionally has to travel through the narrow 
corridor.  The trajectory stays in the neighborhood of h(1) for possibly long time, as the 
economy’s business sector expands gradually.  Then, the economy starts accelerating through the 
credit multiplier effect.  At the peak, the traders start investing.  Then, the economy plunges into a 
recession (possibly after going through a period of high volatility, as the trajectory oscillates 
around k*).  Then, at the bottom, the economy begins its slow and long process of expansion.  
The map depicted in Figure 9 is said to display intermittency, because its dynamic behavior is 
characterized by a relatively long (but seemingly random) periods of small movements punctuated 
by intermittent periods of violent movements.
29 
 
 Example 3. 
As in Examples 1 and 2, let f(n)= 2(Kn)
1/2 with K < m1, 4mm2, and impose the same restrictions to 
ensure W(kc) £ min {kl, kcc}.  This guarantees Y(kr) = P
-1(r) < W(kc) £ min {kl, kcc}.  As seen 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
28 Since kr < k* < P
-1(r), the map does not intersect with the 45￿ line in [kl1, kr). 
29 What is significant here is that the introduction of the credit multiplier effect can create the intermittency, 
regardless of the functional form of f.  Even without the credit multiplier effect, one can always choose a 
functional form of f, so as to make the function W(k) = Y(k) come close to the 45￿ line below kc to generate the 
intermittency phenomenon.  In this sense, the presence of the credit multiplier effect is not necessary for the 
intermittency.  It simply makes it more plausible. Credit Cycles, January 22, 2002, 1:57 PM 
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in Examples 1 and 2, 1 - K/m < l2R < K/m, and R > K/(1-l2)m ensure that the conditions in 
Proposition 1E are satisfied.   Let us choose r such that K/mr
2 < (1 - l2R/r) < K/mr (this is 
feasible because l2R + K/m > 1) and l1 such that K/r
2 < 1 - l1 < m(1 - l2R/r).  Then, (24) can 
be rewritten in the relevant range as 
    (zt)
1/2,    if zt £ z¢, 
     l1/r(1 - Kzt),    if z¢ < zt £ zl1, 
(26) zt+1 = y(zt) ”  1/r,     if zl1 < zt £ zr. 
    [1 - (K/m)zt]/(l2R),  if zr < zt £ 1/r, 
where zt ” (kt/K)
1/2 and z¢ ” (k¢/K)
1/2,  zl1 ” (kl1/K)
1/2, and zr ” (kr/K)
1/2 satisfy (z¢)
1/2 = l1/r(1 - 
Kz¢), l1 = 1 - Kzl1 , and l2R/r = [1 - (K/m)zr],  and z¢ < zl1 < zr < z* = 1/(l2R+K/m) < 1/r < 1.
 Let l1 < 1/2, or equivalently zl1 > (h(1)/K)
1/2 = 1/2K.   If l1 ‡ r/4K, z* is the unique 
steady state of (26).  If l1 < r/4K, z1** ” [1 - (1 - 4l1K/r)
1/2]/2K and z2** ” [1 + (1 - 
4l1K/r)
1/2]/2K are two additional steady states of (26).  They satisfy z1** < (h(1)/K)
1/2 < z2**.  If 
1/2K < y
2(zr) = [1 - (K/mr)]/(l2R), then z* remains the unique steady state in I ” [y
2(zr), zr], 
for all l1 > l1min , where l1min  is defined by  [1 + (1 - 4l1minK/r)
1/2]/2K ” [1 - (K/mr)]/(l2R). If  
1/2K > y
2(zr) = [1 - (K/mr)]/(l2R), then a tangent bifurcation occurs at l1 = r/4K, and 
intermittency phenomena emerge for l1 > r/4K. 
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
 This paper has presented dynamic general equilibrium models of imperfect credit markets, 
in which the economy fluctuates endogenously along its unique equilibrium path.  During 
recessions, the agents are too poor to be able to finance their trading activities.  Much of the 
saving thus goes to business investment, which creates jobs, thereby making the next generation 
of the agents richer.   As the economy booms and the net worth of the agents improves, they can 
eventually finance their trading activities, which do not create any job.  As more credit is extended 
to trading at the expense of business investment, the economy plunges into a recession.  The 
whole process repeats itself.  Endogenous fluctuations occur because, as in ecological cycles 
driven by predator-prey or host-parasite interactions, good investment breeds bad investment, Credit Cycles, January 22, 2002, 1:57 PM 
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which destroys good investment.  When this credit reversal mechanism is combined with the 
credit multiplier mechanism studied in the literature, the model generates asymmetry in business 
cycles.  That is, the economy experiences a long and slow process of recovery, followed by a 
rapid expansion, and then, possibly after periods of high volatility, it plunges into a recession. Credit Cycles, January 22, 2002, 1:57 PM 
  32
Appendix: Proof of Proposition 3. 
Because the introduction of the storage technology changes the map only for (k¢,kr), and since kr 
< k* < P
-1(r) implies Y(kt) > kt in [kl1, kr), the dynamical system, (24), could have additional 
steady states only in (k¢, kl1), where it is given by  
(*) kt+1 = Y(kt) = P
-1(r[1 - W(kt)]/l1).   
By differentiating (*) and then setting kt = kt+1 = k**, the slope of the map at a steady state in this 
range is equal to Y¢(k**) = - rW¢(k**)/P¢(k**)l1 = rk**/l1, which is increasing in k**.  Since 
Y is continuous, and Y(k¢) > k¢ and Y(kl1) > kl1 hold, this means that either  
i) the map intersects with the 45￿ line twice at k1** and k2** > k1**;  
ii) it is tangent to the 45￿ line at a single point, k**˛ (k¢, kl1) and Y(kt) > kt in (k¢, kl1)/{k**};  
or 
iii) Y(kt) > kt in (k¢, kl1).   
 Consider the case of ii).  Then, rk**/l1 = 1 and k** = P
-1(r[1 - W(k**)]/l1), which 
imply that P(k**)k** + W(k**) = f(1/k**)k** = 1, or k** = h(1) = l1/r.  Thus, l1 = rh(1)  
implies that (*) is tangent to the 45￿ line at k** = h(1).  Furthermore, h(1) = Y(h(1)) < W(h(1)) 
implies that l1P(W(h(1)))/[1 - W(h(1))] < l1P(h(1))/[1- W(h(1))] = l1/h(1) = r = 
l1P(W(k¢))/[1- W(k¢)], or equivalently, k** = h(1) > k¢, and l1 < 1 - W(h(1)) implies that k** = 
h(1) < kl1. This proves Proposition 3B.  The case of i) can always be obtained by increasing r 
from the case of i), which shifts down the map to create a stable steady state at k1** < h(1) and an 
unstable steady state at k2** > h(1).  This proves Proposition 3A.  Otherwise, iii) must hold, i.e., 
the map must lie above 45￿ line over the entire range, in (k¢, kl1), which completes the proof of 
Proposition 3.    
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